

175 Sanusi against the Italians in Cyrenaica. "When the British
648 reached Matruh, they jailed all of the 'umdas and shaikhs
554 (two 'umdas and five shaikhs, at that time). Then they chose
631 new leaders, from the families of the old leaders, to work
with them." But, "these men did not fight with the British,
they only acted as their guides in dealing with the Bedouins
of the desert. When the old leaders were released from jail,
they returned to their positions of political office. While
they were in jail, their replacements had only helped the
British with supplies." Apparently, the British saw the need
[178] of maintaining the continuity of the Bedouin authority structure.

175 Data on the condition of the Bedouins of the Western
648 Desert between the two world wars are absent. The Bedouins
say that they lived with no trouble, or any help, from the
Egyptians. The Bedouins have no fond memories of their
experiences during World War II. They first heard of the war
in 1940 when the Italians marched into Western Desert from
Libya. The Germans occupied al-Qasr from May to October of
1942, when the famous General Rommel had his headquarters at
Marsa Matruh. The British had told the Bedouins, in 1940,
that they should flee the Italians, and that unless they did
they would be held responsible for their actions. Most of the
175 people of al-Qasr agreed to go to refugee camps at Amriyya
648 near Alexandria for the duration of the war.
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• [556] Some of the Bedouins refused to leave for Amriyya.

175 These were the wealthy group who had large numbers of sheep
648 and camels. In fact, most of the animals taken east to
722 Amriyya died on the way or were expropriated by the British.
• 556
166 'Umrān Kailani, "who owned one thousand camels" and was the
shaikh of the 'Ali Abmar section of the Awlad 'Ali at the time,
refused to go to Amriyya. The Bedouins say that he was treated
very well by the Germans who asked him to form a local govern-
ment and promised him all the help and supplies that he
needed. It is difficult to obtain figures on how many Bedouins
made the migration to the Nile Valley and how many remained
behind in the Al-Qasr area. One informant told me that before
[162] the war there were about 80,000 members of the Awlad 'Ali in
the Western Desert and that out of this number, about 30,000
remained behind.

175 Those who sought refuge at Amriyya returned to the
648 al-Qasr area at the end of 1942 after the defeat of the Germans
727 at al-Alamain. They found things greatly changed. Before the
war, there had been about twenty buildings in the al-Qasr area
and most of these were bombed out by the air war. The loss of
animals and the damage to the land made the resumption of
normal life quite difficult for the Bedouins. Underneath,
the land was literally a bed of anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines left by the advance and retreat of three different
armies. This restricted Bedouin travel and everyday food-
getting activities. This condition, which still exists, has
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342 costs to make or buy. In the 'izba sector, most of the Bedouin have a summer tent which they place next to their stone house for the hot months. According to the governmental community [557] development program, in order to own land and register it

properly one must build at least one room upon it. The one-

[735] room house (daar) is not common in al-Qasr: it is a symbol

of poverty. The multi-roomed house (duwaar) is common. It is

[333] built of large pieces of cut sandstone which are quarried in

[316] al-Qasr. Those who can afford it build the duwaar and surround

342 it with a wall in compound fashion. Only one man in al-Qasr

•556 is rich enough to afford two of these compound-type houses.

The size and style of a house reflect status. Traditionally,

[184] a man furnished a tent for each wife and for each married son.

Although this is still the custom in parts of the desert, in al-Qasr the private room (daar) in a duwaar has replaced the private tent.

596 The basic residential unit is called naja' (literally, "hamlet"). It is composed of the father, his wife (wives), his unmarried children, and married sons and their families. The naja' takes the name of the father who is called the shaib ("elder," literally, "white-haired one") of the group. In the naja', the word of the shaib is law, and the members' chief duty is unquestionable obedience. The average naja' in al-Qasr consists of about three or four houses or tents.

361 1925 and 1930 because, as they point out, the British
648 administration provided employment for "the poor Bedouin."

361 The wealthier Bedouins who owned camels and large numbers of
• 556 sheep remained in the desert. Just the reverse is happening
198 at the present time. The rich men who see the advantages in
business, and the comforts which Matruh offers, can also
afford the change of residence or the maintenance of two
residences.

175 In 1922, the Egyptian government first registered land
423 in al-Qasr. At this time, they sanctioned the tribal division
657 of territory which existed. There was no attempt to force
political integration upon the Bedouins. Egypt has never had
a nomad problem as have other Middle Eastern countries. The
history of Egypt is essentially the history of the Nile Valley.
Consequently, it is not odd that we find no mention of the
Awlad 'Ali in the historical record. The Bedouins of the
Western Desert were resigned to their place in the desert, and
the central government saw no particular advantage or disadvantage
in this.

423 Concern for the Bedouin minority in Egypt emerged only
648 with nationalistic programs of modernization. In 1954, the
Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States
in the Middle East convened in Baghdad. From this meeting
came some general recommendations for dealing with the problems
of the Bedouin. The major proposal was calculated to transform

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The Bedouin of al-Qasr idealize the life of the pastoralist. It is a dominant theme in their culture. Gardening and arboriculture are perceived by the Bedouins as involving long hours of work, anxiety over waiting for profits, and complex market operations. They understand the logic and operation of the sheep market. Sheep are a store of value, a source of security, and a medium of exchange. In a good year of rain, a man can reap a good crop of barley, and buy more sheep against the inevitable bad year to come. While most Bedouins are, in one way or another, involved with the modern cash economy which ties al-Qasr to Marsa Matruh, the Bedouins who go into the production of cash crops on a large scale are those who can afford the risk of failure and who can survive the meager profits of the initial stage. These are the men who can adjust their world view from that of the pastoralist to that of the entrepreneur. There are only a few of these men in al-Qasr but they dominate the economy. Through them, most of the Bedouins of al-Qasr are linked to the national economy.

Land and Economy

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The period between 1960 and 1964 was one of significant economic change in al-Qasr. Dependence upon farming increased while pastoralist activities became less important. In the past, none of the Bedouins now living in al-Qasr were "nomads;" even my oldest informants had moved only once or twice to

These gardens

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433 furnish staples for local consumption and more cash crops for
241 the Marsa Matruh market. Matruh is dependent upon these
311 vegetable goods from al-Qasr, to the extent that the Governor
434 has forbidden the Bedouins to truck their goods to the higher
443 priced market in Alexandria.
[656]

654 The success of arboriculture in al-Qasr has been the
245 result of a well-organized reclamation program in this area
177 by the government. The relatively good supply of fresh water
433 and the proximity of a large market town has made al-Qasr an
atypical case in the government's attempt to transform the
desert pastoral economy. Since 1960, the government's program
has met with a great deal of success. Such results have, of
course, induced the Bedouins of al-Qasr to accept change,
and have further enhanced the future of the program. The
figures below show, as of 1964, the plant distribution of
orchards in the 'izba of al-Qasr, and indicate the measure
of success attained by the governmental reclamation program.

The environmental conditions of al-Qasr are particularly
well-suited for the olive tree: the olive has been the basis
of the economic transformation of al-Qasr. The Bedouins tend
to play down the government's role in developing olive arbori-
culture in the al-Qasr area. But before 1960, only the very
• [556] wealthy men could afford to deal in the olive market, since it
involves a great initial financial risk. Hence, prior to the
entry of the government's program, there were 2,743 olive trees

TABLE 1
ARBORICULTURE IN AL-QASR, 1964

Plant	Acres	Plants Distributed	Successful Plants
Olive	947	40,399	32,488 (80%)
Almond	57	2,570	1,752 (67%)
Fig	66	10,537	(experimental stage)
Grape	.5	512	512 (100%)
Peach	2.5	804	200 (20%)

in al-Qasr, and these were distributed among only 27 men.
Most of these men also owned large numbers of sheep.

In 1960, the government began planting olive trees on the registered land of individuals living in the 'izba sector. This plan also involved instructing the Bedouins in the care of the tree: an individual who had traditionally depended on the rains now had to learn irrigation farming. This aspect of the program, learning modern "water discipline," was a source of conflict for the Bedouin with his pastoralist outlook on life. The olive tree must be watered twice weekly. The Bedouins say that this made them feel like "peasants." The Bedouins were also apprehensive over the fact that the olive tree did not bear its first fruit, i.e., the first cash

* 613
582 'Ailit Lazumi, the other lineage, along with 'Ailit Ma'fas,
considered to be the most powerful in al-Qasr. In the fourth
[423] case, Abd al-Latif's marriage into 'Ailit Dawlat, this in-
dividual owns an olive orchard in Dawlat territory, adjacent
to that of Ma'fas, which he purchased from a member of his
wife's lineage before their marriage. In every case, with
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582 one-exception, marriage ties are intimately related to property
421 relations, cognation with local contiguity. The two groups
become politically entwined, and property relations become
a basis for authority relations.

* 613 All things considered, complementary filiation is as
important in Bedouin society as it is in other societies:
"The bilateral family is the focal element in the web of
[533] kinship" (Fortes 1953:33). As one Bedouin wedding song puts
it: "The bride is the flower of the stem," the stem here
symbolizing her tertiary group.

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554 The amount of brideprice which a man is expected to
556 pay will depend upon his status as an "outsider" or an "insider,"
and his position on the prestige scale which is figured largely
in terms of wealth. A man adds to his prestige and reputation
when he pays beyond the "going price" to obtain a bride for
his son. On the other hand, if a man is an "outsider," he is
expected to pay well beyond the normal brideprice for the
privilege of marrying into the family, and he receives no
additional prestige unless he goes even higher than what is

583 expected. The price is set by the corporate group but can
554 vary, and usually does, from one tertiary segment to another.
• 556 The wealthier tertiary segments tend to have higher bride-
prices. This is explained by the fact that they occupy a
"higher status" on the prestige scale, and also, by the fact
that they wish to carefully control and maintain this status.

[435] For instance, "between cousins" of 'Ailit Ma'fas the
mahr is fixed at 60 Egyptian pounds, but "a man can pay more
out of generosity if he wishes." Hence, a member of the
Ma'fas lineage can increase his prestige within and without
his family by paying beyond that which is expected of him.
In this case, "generosity" is the variable related to a man's
place on the scale of prestige. On the other hand, in another
583 "poorer" lineage, 'Ailit Zagharat, the mahr is 30 L.E. to
554 members of the in-group but "the stranger will pay 60 to 80
556 L.E., according to the father's wealth." The largest and
435 most famous mahr payment in the area was made by the wealthiest
man in al-Qasr who paid seven camels (each worth about 150 L.E.)
for his son's wife. The highest fixed mahr in al-Qasr was
that of Bait Bu-Tarram of 'Ailit Lazumi. It was 100 L.E.
for members of 'Ailit Lazumi and, accordingly, much more for
strangers." This mahr is in contrast to the average for the
area which is about 30 L.E. within the secondary group.

586 Divorce is a forbidden topic of conversation in al-Qasr.
521 Any talk about one's wife, mother, or sister is considered in-
784 judicious.

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[571] Each member of the corporate group contributes an equal share to the blood-money due in a compensation case. The blood-price for intentional killing is presently set at 400 L.E. In the olden days, the blood-price was 100 camels. If a man had no camels, he was expected to contribute his share in cash, the value to be assessed at current market prices. Eventually, cash came to replace camels altogether in the exchange of blood-money. This reflects the growing importance of the camel in the Western Desert. Today, there is only one man in al-Qasr who may be considered a "camel owner," and he is the richest man in the area. Since at least 1935 the blood-price has been met with cash.

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591 When it has been decided that the right of blood-revenge as a retaliatory measure is to be waived, the 'aqila' must go to each member of the group for his share of the blood-money. Each 'aqila' of the secondary group does this, and together their collections make up the 400 L.E. blood price. For instance, if there happens to be 400 men in a secondary lineage group, then the share which each contributes will be 1 L.E. The 'aqila' must account for his own group's share even if this means making up deficiencies from his own pocket. It is for this reason that the 'aqila' "should be rich." Though the 'awda-gil' of al-Qasr are generally members of the "status group," this is not always the case. Hussain, the man destined to become the 'aqila' of Baft Braik, was comparatively poor. He admitted to this fact, and said that for this reason he was reluctant to become an 'aqila': "The 'aqila' is responsible for his bait."

000 order.

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666 The 'aqila' is elected by the elders of the secondary lineage group. The election usually takes place when these men are gathered for some festive occasion, such as a wedding.

[578] The name of the man chosen to succeed to the political office will not be made public until it is absolutely necessary, i.e., in the case of conflict within the man's bait, or more especially, in the case where blood-money is due. According to the Bedouins, the only qualification for the office of 'aqila' is wisdom--

*613
554 the ability to arbitrate disputes. On the other hand, it is implicit that the 'aqila' be a member of the "status group."

• 556 Prestige commands respect and obedience, and prestige in al-Qasr usually comes with wealth. In general, the 'aqila' is an elder, i.e., one with wisdom, and a member of a wealthy and influential family.

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[428] Technically, the 'aqila-ship' is not inherited, but succession tends in this direction. An 'aqila' must "speak the good and show men how to follow the path of the good." Not all men have the ability to do this, and, the Bedouins say, it is natural that such a great gift resides with a particular family "because the son learns from the father." All of the 'awaaqil' in al-Qasr claim that they knew how to settle disputes before they became 'awaaqil'. If they had not, they would not have been worthy of the office. Actually, the choice of an 'aqila' is a restricted one: the office may pass, according to

554 concerns magic. Each August there is a celebration in honor
571 of al-Qasr's local saint. At these celebrations, the darwish
178 performs his special skills such as putting a red-hot iron
789 to his tongue, or standing on a skin drum held high by his
796 two assistants. No member of the "status group" attends these
affairs because the darwish and his magic "belong totally to
the old way of life." This is a restriction on social inter-
course. It may also be a rejection of the saint's sacred
power, or reluctance on the part of the "status group" to
share authority. The ideology which the "status group" in
554 al-Qasr has developed embodies attitudes of cooperation and
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183 patience with induced programs of change. These attitudes
are invoked in varying degrees corresponding to motives of
economic gain, desire for power, and altruistic concern. But
the result is a "status group" mood which may be described
as one of disdain for the old way of life. Ideology and
discontent in al-Qasr are mainly evident among the members of
the "status group."

554 The pool from which the members of the "status group"
556 are recruited consists of the "status honor" possessors of
571 three lineages (two Sa'adi and one Marabit). These have been,
* [613] traditionally and presently, the wealthiest and most influential
in al-Qasr. Wealth in al-Qasr is defined in terms of three
things: sheep, land, and olives. Olives are becoming the
measure of wealth in the modern al-Qasr: sheep are the tradi-

tional symbol of wealth. A comparison of wealth between the "status group" and "other members" of al-Qasr, and the picture of stratification which emerges, are shown on Table 6.

TABLE 6

COMPARATIVE DATA ON SOCIO-ECONOMIC
STRATIFICATION IN AL-QASR¹

Average Per Person	Status Group	Others
OLIVE - trees	661	86
SHEEP - head	402	30
LAND - acres	91	5

One most important way of accruing "status honor" in al-Qasr is by acting the part of the third party in conflict situations. The role of the third party represents an effective and acceptable way of bypassing formal litigation through the office of 'agila. For instance, by mediating through the process of nazaala, the third party prevents feuds.

¹This data is both approximate and partial. Some data are excellent and completely reliable, others are not so dependable. Factors which could conceivably change the picture here presented would be a count of land and animals outside al-Qasr which would be extremely difficult to obtain. Also, some land is not in the name of the owner but in the names of relatives. Of all the data, land data is the most unreliable. Nevertheless, the addition of new data, I feel, would only serve to substantiate the picture of socio-economic stratification shown here.

554 turns in times of need dealing with financial and personal,
571 problems. In view of the value stress which the Bedouins
627 place upon generosity, manifest in the redistributive system
182 of the lineage, the wealth of the rajal khair is the wealth
[181] of the community. Wealth divides, not only possessors from
• [556] non-possessors, but also, seekers after security from power
seekers. It is as Peters (1965:145) has noted in Cyrenaica:
generosity, not being entirely altruistic, wins repute and
repute is an important aspect of political power.

554 In an interview concerning the justice of blood-
682 revenge, there was general agreement that if a man kills
627 intentionally, then blood-revenge must be taken by the
* 613 murdered man's bait against someone in the murderer's aiela.
829 But one prominent man (a rajal khair) protested that "the
best man in the killer's family must not be harmed." This
statement generated a rather heated debate. One man said
"The best man should be killed for this is right in the
Bedouin type of justice." (This comment was made by a man
who is the 'agila of a low-status lineage in al-Qasr.) The
first speaker's reply to the protest was this:

[178] Nevertheless, it all depends upon the character of
the best man . . . if he is evil and on bad terms
with your family, then he will be the first one to
be killed. But if he is a good man, then you kill
the murderer himself . . . You must never kill a
rajal khair because he may do good in the future.
In the old days, the killing started right away, and
all problems were big ones: today there is negotiation--
people are improving.

634 his brother sits in his place.

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The present shaikh is a member of 'Ailit Ma'fas, and

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this is to offset the fact that the office of 'umda is in 'Ailit Lazumi. It reflects the need to distribute official power and to symbolize the real power structure. Historically, the Lazumi were more powerful than the Ma'fas. These two lineages are the largest, wealthiest, and most influential in al-Qasr and among the 'Aishaibat. When the present

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shaikh's father decided to retire due to old age, he requested

that his son be allowed to take up his role. The 'awaaqil of the 'Aishaibat in al-Qasr approved this "nomination" and

•[556]

the son was "elected." It is a fact that the shaikh's father is the richest man among the members of the 'Ailit Ma'fas and that the 'umda's father was the richest man of 'Ailit Lazumi.

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Power groups tend to interact so as to enhance not the official authority structure but the political status quo (Peters 1967:279). This explains a practice of the "status group" which Max Weber referred to as "connubism," the tendency of the members of this group to exchange women among themselves.

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In Figure 10,¹ the marriages of 'Ait Abd al-Malik of Bait 'Unar of 'Ailit Ma'fas show that out of seventeen marriages only four of these were within the 'Aishaibat, and that three out of four of these marriages were with 'Ailit Lazumi. Even more impressive is the information obtained from considering 1. [See p. 132--Analyst]

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[571] draw al-Qasr into the Egyptian political community. He has committed himself to work hand-in-hand with the Governor of Marsa Matruh in introducing changes connected with economics and education into al-Qasr. He does not conceal this fact. When I spoke with him about helping me with my study of changing attitudes in al-Qasr, he said: "I might have the time to do this, but before I decide you will have to bring me a letter from the Governor stating that he wishes me to cooperate with you." The identity and responsibility which Hajj 'Ali feels for his role of agent of change is indicated in his remark to me that he had heard "there were others in the desert who feel and think the way I myself do."

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[735] Hajj 'Ali is discretely aware of the status difference between himself, as a member of the "status group," and the others of al-Qasr. As Weber would say, he perceives the difference in "style of life." I was invited to Hajj 'Ali's house for 'iid al-fitr, the feast marking the end of Ramadan. I thought that this would be a good opportunity to observe the "leaders" of al-Qasr together. I was very much surprised to find present no members of the "status group" but only their exact opposites. On the occasion of this feast it is the custom that the rich treat the poor. As an additional surprise, we had a very simple meal of bread, dates, peanuts, and tea. Hajj 'Ali explained to me: "My neighbors do not have my economic advantages, and I do not think it is proper

423 many generations a recognized right by the Egyptian government to use
311 the land for grazing and cultivation, and the tribal concept is that
the land belongs to the tribe.

The concept is true with regard to wells and cisterns. But
legally speaking, land belongs to the state, and the tribal populations
in the area have only the right of usufruct. This does not mean that
the land is exploited jointly by all members of one tribe or tribal
segment, or that a man can cultivate or graze his flocks in any part
he chooses, for there is a certain correlation between the right of
usufruct and the distribution of the tribes in the area on the one hand,
and the inner tribal segmentation on the other. Although land is not
• (556) an object of ownership in itself, and wealth is not spoken of in terms
of land, yet, the distinction between ownership and usufruct in the

423 area is sometimes very hard to draw. Each tribal segment has its name
311 associated with a specific area of land which it regards as its own
619 and whose boundaries it defends against other tribal segments. The
tribal segment whose name is associated with a certain locality not only
has the right to use the land, but this right is also vested in it to
the exclusion of other segments. Within such an area, each subsegment
has the right to a portion of the land to the exclusion of the other
subsegments. While individual members of the tribal segments know the
land belonging to their tribal segments, their right is not associated
with a specific patch within the total area. Individuals usually cul-
tivate different patches within that total area as the need may arise;
but one cannot cultivate a patch in an area belonging to another tribal
segment except under certain conditions. This does not mean that the
individual cannot claim the right to a specific patch, for not only

His Bait is the wealthiest in the
613 Aggary and he himself has recently acquired a great amount of wealth,
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627 mostly from smuggling goods across the Libyan borders. Because of his
• [556] position as a Government Sheikh, he is believed to have influential con-
nections in the government. He is the only member of the Aggary Amar
who has a car. He considers himself to be the spokesman of the Aggary
Family, and he is known to be able to persuade the reluctant awaql to
conform to decisions made by the rest of the awaql. In a number of in-
[682] stances he was able to collect bloodmoney from members of the Amar who
had previously refused to pay. Some people in the area believe that had
it not been for the persuasive abilities of Sheikh Selouma, the Aggary
Amar could never have persisted, and it would have long ago been divided
into smaller units due to the lack of agreement among its members. The
613 lack of formalized leadership of the Amar or the Eila makes consensus of
extreme importance for the Amar. The emphasis on the unity of the Amar
[675] is stated in Article 2 and is implied in a number of other articles in
[578] the Amar paper of Aggary. Disagreement among the awaql is very rare al-
though not unknown in the area. The relative consensus among the awaql
613 stems from the fact that the Amar as a group has a fairly limited function.
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[182] Until very recently the only practical function of the Amar was the collec-
tion of money to pay for a murder committed by one of its members. Since
establishing the innocence or guilt of the accused is not the duty of the
Amar, once his guilt has been established, there is no question about
the payment. Disagreements are likely to occur in the case of new circum-
613 stances where money has to be paid, since payment in such cases are not
682 yet institutionalized, even when specified in a given Amar paper. This
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000 has not yet become a major problem. If any disagreement between the

613 In performing his functions within the bait, personal qualities such as
554 wisdom, soundness of ideas, personal persuasiveness are of importance.
157 But the main basis of his authority is patrilineal succession. The Aqila
428 has no economic power to speak of. Although many aqila are among the
556 wealthiest members of their baits, many more are among its poorest. The
nature of the economic process and the pastoral life of Awlad Ali is
such that the economic position of the individual is always fluctuating.
Nor does the Aqila have any military power at his disposal, or any com-
mand of the use of force to back his decisions or to make them binding
upon members of his bait. The main source of compliance to the Aqila's
428 decisions comes from the knowledge that the Aqila has the authority to
make such decisions and that he has acquired this authority through the
legitimate channel of patrilineal succession.

613 Where membership in formal groups is transmitted by descent, Awlad
428 Ali always choose the patriline. The son of Awlad Ali is regarded as
562 Awlad Ali even though his mother might not be from the tribe, while a
619 woman who marries outside the tribe transmits no rights in the tribe to
her children. The importance of agnatic kin is reinforced by an solid-
ary of brothers which is extended laterally to patrilineal cousins. It
is also shown in the fact that sons are favored in inheritance usually
to the exclusion of daughters. The male line is viewed by Awlad Ali as
the natural principle when it comes to anything which is inheritable,
whether property or position. In an attempt to defend Shei'eb's posi-
tion and his right to be the Aqila, one informant told me: "The main pur-
pose that a man has in life is to have sons because it is the son who
makes the man live forever. Daughters don't count. A man gives his son

613 usually has no difficulty collecting the individual shares. His own
682 financial ability is rarely called upon. When a member is unable to
[554] pay for any reason, his share is divided among the able members. However,
[178] in recent years this seems to be changing, especially among the baits
closely located to the settled communities or the urban centers. Among
613 these baits individual mobility has increased significantly with a large
178 number of younger members either leaving the area for the urban centers
166 or accepting salaried jobs with the government organizations. Among
464 certain baits in the area of Burg el-Arab, for example, the percentage
369 of adult males engaged in such jobs sometimes reaches sixty percent.
More than thirty-five out of fifty-six males constituting bait Asabei'
have a full-time or part-time job.

613 The individualistic attitudes accompanying the dependency on sal-
178 aries and living in towns and cities have their effects on the kinship
166 ties among members of these baits. With the prevalence of the individ-
464 ualistic attitudes among members of a certain bait, they become more
682 reluctant to pay their financial obligations and the Aqila finds it more
369 and more difficult to rely, for the fulfillment of the bait's financial
obligations, on the willingness of members to pay. His success within
613 the domain of the amar becomes more determined by his ability to pay
554 from his own money for those members of his bait who refuse or are un-
556 able to pay. Wealth becomes an important asset for the Aqila's per-
682 formance of his duties within the amar. When this happens, there seems
to be a certain shift in the source of political support for the Aqila.

613 In a well-integrated bait the popularity (or unpopularity) of the Aqila
554 among the other Awaqil of the amar had very little influence on his

613 position as the leader of the bait. The principle of patrilineal suc-
554 cession is so respected in such baits that it overshadows any other con-
613 sideration. This continues to be the case as long as the kinship ties
554 within the bait remain strong. When the kinship ties in a given bait
428 weaken, the principle of patrilineal succession also weakens. This is
178 more likely to occur in baits where a relatively large number of the
[166] members leave the area permanently or for a more or less prolonged period
[464] of time, seeking jobs on a part or a full-time basis. Many of these
613 members maintain only a minimal contact with their respective baits.
178 They become more reluctant to fulfill their kinship obligations, es-
166 pecially when they entail any financial liability. The older members
464 complain about how younger persons are less loyal to their elders and
561 how selfish they have become. "All they care about is their jobs and
369 the pleasure they get from the city; they are becoming city people."
Younger members, on the other hand, maintain that their reluctance to
fulfill their kinship obligations stems from their feeling that they
do not get anything in return. "Life is expensive and money is hard to
obtain. I cannot make enough money to support myself and my wife and
children and at the same time pay my cousin's financial debts," said a
member of 'illat Asabei', who works as a driver with the Desert Organi-
zation in Alexandria.

613 When this happens, there seems to be a tendency toward shifting the
554 emphasis from the bait to the eila or the amar as the source of the po-
[556] litical support of the Aqila. This in turn makes wealth an important
basis of the Aqila's power. No more can the bait impose an ineffective
Aqila on the amar unless it is ready to back him by their own share of
money. If this is lacking as was the case with Shei'eb, there is nothing

613 His success in solving disputes between members
628 of his baits and outsiders might enhance his prestige within the bait,
554 but it is not a substitute for patrilineal succession as the basis of
[428] the Aqila's authority. But in less integrated baits the situation is
[627] different. The ineffectiveness of the Aqila in solving disputes may
lead members of his bait to seek another man as their representative who
would act as a mediator in their behalf. If this continues for a long
time the Aqila might find himself with no functions and the new person
would become a de facto Aqila.

613 The Aqila represents the only effective indigenous form of leader-
554 ship among Awlad Ali at the present time. The camp headman provides
622 another form of leadership on the camp level, but, as mentioned before,
the leadership of the headman is very limited and involves minimal
634 authority. In addition to the indigenous leadership represented by the
622 Aqila, there is the superimposed administrative structure of the govern-
656 ment representative in the form of the "omda" system introduced into the
177 area by the government decree no. 1187 of 1958. The system of omda or
mayorship is essentially that applied to the rural areas of Egypt with
certain modifications to fit the tribal organization and the semi-nomadic
existence of the populations of the Western Desert. In rural areas, the
622 omda is the administrative head of the village. He is appointed by the
[554] government from among the village inhabitants who have certain qualifi-
[212] cations with regard to education (must be able at least to read and
[556] write), wealth (own at least 5 feddans of land in the area), and sound
reputation. As such, the omda system in the rural areas is a territorial
system. The omda's authority covers the territory of the village and
all individuals living in it regardless of their kinship affiliation.

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Wealth in many cases is also considered an important requirement for the selection of the mardi. This does not mean that religious men in the area have no role in dispute settlement, for they do. It simply means that the mardi is selected according to a number of criteria that vary from case to case, and that in some of these cases sound wisdom and fairness characteristic of religious men are not enough basis for their selection as mardis. This means that the religious men have no special mediatory role based on their religious nature alone. In certain cases religious men offer the best possibility for mediation; in others, a non-religious person might offer a better chance for settling the dispute. In cases of women seeking divorce from their husbands, the wealth of the mediator, more than anything else, seems to determine the selection of the man whom the woman asks to negotiate on her behalf, a point to which I will return later in the chapter.

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The Mi'ad was held in the house of Muftah. Present at the mi'ad were Muftah, his son-in-law, Hemeida, the heads of households in Muftah's camp (one of them was his brother and the other five were members of different tribal segments), my driver (who was a member of the neighboring Sanagrah tribal segment), myself, and the religious man. After the tea was served, the religious man said that the discussion should start. He reminded the gathering that this case is a family one and should not develop into a larger dispute. "After all, the daughter's husband is a son, and the case is actually a misunderstanding between a father and a son and should be viewed in that context." Then he turned to Muftah and said that in that spirit he was asking him why he had taken his daughter away from her husband. Muftah said that he had taken his daughter away

586 the man she chooses. She informs him before she enters his house that
562 she is the wife of so and so and the daughter of so and so and that she
574 is throwing herself on him to protect her from her husband with whom

[178] she no longer wishes to live. Like the right of refuge, the man cannot
refuse to let her in; and from this moment until her dispute with her
husband is resolved, she is considered as his house guest and is en-
titled to all the hospitality a guest receives. If he refuses to ex-
[627]
[181] tend that hospitality or refuses to take her in, she can ask for a mi'ad
and is entitled to kabara from him. There has been no reported incidents

in which a man refused that right to a woman. As soon as she settles
down in the host's house, the latter takes immediate measures to find
the husband and to convince him to let his wife go. In doing this, the
man uses all the power of persuasion. The man selected for this purpose
is usually a respected man who can put pressure upon the husband. Some-
586 times he has to bribe the husband to release the wife, paying from his
562 own money. The man has to have money, not only to be able to support
574 the wife during her stay in his house and to bribe the husband, but also
554 because in certain instances he has to pay the husband the mahr that the
[556] father of the wife had taken in order to free her. The next step after

getting the agreement of the husband to divorce his wife is to contact
the father of the wife or her guardian and convince him to pay the mahr
to the husband. If the father does not agree, or if he is financially
unable to do so, the man on whom the woman has thrown herself is supposed
to pay from his own money. In cases where the woman left the husband to
be married to another man with whom she had had a relationship, the re-
spected man tries to have the future husband pay the present husband the
mahr he is supposed to pay the woman after she is divorced from her

THE BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

243 They could not sow a better crop. There are wild varieties of barley in Cyrenaica and the country is in every way suited to its culture. It is very hardy, stands up to drought, and easily holds its own against the grasses, which are ploughed in with the seed on the plateau. When the barley and wheat have [251] been reaped, the grain is stored in *kuf*. On the plateau these are ancient tomb-caves; elsewhere they are holes dug in the ground.

[731] In a bad year, and even more in a succession of bad years, the Bedouin have experienced famine, but in most years the barley, and to a lesser extent the wheat, give an abundant [433] yield. Bedouin have told me that they expect from sowing in the beds of wadis up to a hundredfold of barley and in the *barqa* up to fiftyfold. On the plateau the yield is smaller and in the Marmarica and Sirtica much smaller. In Turkish times [439] there was a large export of grain from Cyrenaica. Mondaini says that it was to the mean annual value of 40,000 Lire Sterling for the years 1885 to 1900.¹ Much of this surplus was bought by English brewers.

433 The Bedouin way of life is well adapted to their environment.
182 Given the inconstancy of the rainfall and the distribution of water supplies they would be foolish indeed were they not, at any rate in part, shepherds. They are not, of course, in all respects self-supporting. They make their winter tents and a good part of their equipment, carpets, sacks, and so forth, from the wool of their beasts, but some things the Bedouin regard as necessities have to be imported, notably tea, sugar, some rice, and cloth, especially the *jird*, the woollen cloak of the country. They trade these with surplus stock on the hoof, skins, wool, clarified butter, surplus barley, and honey and wax, so that they are in an economic sense self-supporting.

433 Cyrenaica is a rich country for Bedouin, a poor country for
182 Europeans. Bedouin generally have no overhead expenses in [556] production. I say generally, because rich men sometimes [233] employ shepherds, though this is usually the practice of urban [464] merchants engaged in the sheep trade. Bedouin use their own [511] labour and that of their families and animals. What is perhaps more important is that they are prepared to live on what

¹ G. Mondaini, *Manuale di Storia e Legislazione Coloniale del Regno d'Italia*. 1927, p. 308.

554 derived from the strength of their section, their wealth, their traditional place in Bedouin society, and the character of their leading members, so long only are they regarded as Shaikhs of whatever the grade may be.

554 In recording his impressions of the Aulad 'Ali tribe the
619 generous and unfortunate Pacho gives an excellent picture of
[642] the Bedouin Shaikh's position in tribal society. He says that it is difficult to discover any government in their society, which might be called aristocratic, though it is such in form rather than in substance. The precarious authority of the Shaikhs rests not on force but on the renown and esteem they enjoy in the tribe. He adds that at the time of his visit it had become customary, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had broken the tribe, for the Shaikhs to get their titles confirmed by the Pasha of Egypt but that when they returned to their camps with the robes of honour bestowed on them by the Pasha of Egypt, these garments, far from adding to their prestige and making them objects of regard, excited derision and aversion unless the backing of the tribe had preceded the approval of the Pasha.¹

554 The Italian lawyer Savarese has also written an illuminating
613 description of the status of a Cyrenaican Bedouin Shaikh. Each
[556] *bait* and each *'aila* has its Shaikh, chosen for his age and wisdom or for his prowess, though the Shaikhship is generally hereditary in certain families. A Shaikh receives obedience and respect from his dependants but ought to be rich because the demands of hospitality are considerable. He takes a leading part in the settlement of disputes and must have the tact necessary to maintain the unity of the group in opposition to other groups of the same order. He represents his group in relations with these other groups and in the larger group of which it forms part. In matters in which his group as a whole is concerned he takes the advice of the Shaikhs of its divisions. He commands the men of the group in war and he collects the tribute due from the group to the Government. Nevertheless, a Bedouin Shaikh, however large the group he represents, lives and dresses like his fellow Bedouin, though, being rich, his tent may be larger than most and he has more horses and they are more richly appointed.

¹ J. R. Pacho, *Relation d'un Voyage dans la Marmarique, la Cyrénaïque et les Oasis d'Audjelah et de Maradèh*, 1827, p. 67.

THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION

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[634] Heads of the Sanusiya lodges, who often accompanied the mudirs and tax commissions to the Shaikhs of the tribal sections attached to their lodges. It was to the common interest of the Turkish Administration and of the Sanusiya that there should be order, security, justice, and trade in the country, and they co-operated to maintain them.

• [556] The Turkish officials did their utmost to remain on good terms with the Sanusiya Shaikhs and to this end, and doubtless also because they found no difficulty in accepting, as educated men, its exalted teachings, some of them affiliated themselves to the Order. Membership of it gave them prestige in the eyes of the Bedouin as great, if not greater, than their official status gave them. Likewise the more prosperous merchants who had dealings with the Bedouin tribes or sent caravans to the Sahara and Sudan found it advisable to be received into the Order. It is for this reason that in all the towns of Libya we find a small body of the richer and more cultured citizens ascribed to the Order, while the common people belong to other or no Orders.¹

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*795 But though the administration of Cyrenaica might be called at this period a Turco-Sanusi condominium there was an undercurrent of jealousy on both sides which occasionally gave rise to open conflict. A sure occasion was any effort on the part of the Administration to tax the Sanusiya estates. Although these had been exempted from taxation by the Sultan's firman, the local administration made rare and unsuccessful efforts to exact taxation on them. When in 1908 they tried to tax the crops of the Sanusiya holdings a tribal meeting, attended by 150 Shaikhs headed by 'Umar bu Rqaia of the Darsa tribe, met at the zawiya of al-Haniya and decided not to pay any more tribute to the Turkish Government till it revoked the tax. The Government then dropped the matter, though the trouble continued till 1910. Earlier, the Governor Ahmad Pasha Zuhadi (1904-5), acting on instructions from Istanbul, had tried to impose a tax on the crops of tribesmen and zawiyas alike. The Bedouin round al-Marj had thereupon attacked a Turkish detachment charged with collecting the tax and sent them back to Banghazi stripped of everything they possessed. The outcome was that the Governor was relieved of his office.

¹ Capt. Emilio Canevari, *Zauiæ ed Ichuan Senussiti della Tripolitania*, 1917, *passim*.

Cases

between man and man, although the various cereal dishes which constitute their regular meals are said to have a similar effect.

The son who continues to eat with his father "as he always had been doing," also continues to accept his authority. Indeed he could do little else at this stage, for he lacks the economic means to cut away. Neither at marriage nor after is there any transfer of wealth from father to son. The new tent recently pitched is no more than a dormitory to which the young couple retire at night. During the daytime the son is still to be seen in his father's tent, and, in the male quarters, things appear to be much the same as before. In the female quarters, the only superficial change is the more frequent appearance among the women of one who, before marriage, often sat among them if she had been a close neighbour or a close cousin previously; or of an additional helper if she had come from afar. On the surface things remain "as they always have been," although in fact, a whole set of changes have been initiated.

Rites de passage are few among the Bedouin. A man's progress in life is ceremonially marked by only four events: his birth, circumcision, marriage and burial. His development into manhood is not marked by clearly defined stages. About the age of seven, the henna markings on the front of a boy's shirt for protection from the evil eye are not renewed, the cowrie shell stitched to the front of his cap as a kind of talisman against the evil eye is removed and he is no longer permitted free access to the women's quarters. As he grows older, he will be instructed in goat-herding, and later taught to follow the sheep. In his late teens he will have to undertake the more arduous and responsible task of herding the camels. Coincident with camel-herding, he may be given a gun by his father. Shortly afterwards he must undertake the stringent test of manhood, a journey to a distant oasis for dates. These changes are not marked off by a *rite de passage*. The rites a man undergoes during the course of a lifetime are minimal, and in the sense that they are concerned with only the basic events in a man's life anywhere (save for circumcision, which is a minor celebration anyway), they are irreducible. Moreover, the rituals which exist do not comprehend the same multiplicity of relationships as rituals which occur in many other African societies.⁴ It is true that the ceremonies referred to in this chapter by no means include all the Bedouin rituals. It is also true that the events mentioned vary in elaboration, and in the number of symbols present in them, but they are not multiplied or reduced for different people.

In this context it is important to stress that we are here dealing with a lineage society where social differentiation is not built up into differences of rank, where the roles to which a man succeeds are almost wholly captured by his kinship relationships with other men and which are sociologically to be distinguished from the roles a man enters into by acquisition of office,

⁴ See, for example, the elaboration of rituals discussed in M. Gluckman (Ed.), *Essays on the Ritual of Social Relations*. Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 1962.

Cases

593 tegral part of "the one body"; events which affect a man in this context lie
613 outside a father's field of jurisdiction. The political authority vested in a
corporation acts to circumscribe the authority of persons in other fields.

Other rights stem from political membership. As a person with a defined position in a lineage corporation, a man has the right to use the natural resources of its territory. His father, although he instructs his son where to plough and when to water the animals, cannot deny him access to wells, pastures and ploughland. Economically, a son is independent to this extent, although his ability to exploit his right to the natural resources is restricted by his father's control of animals. Ultimately, however, this restriction cannot amount to stultification, because a man has the right to demand food. In practice, a poor man staves off hunger with donations from this or that individual, and superficially it appears that he is dependent on the personal charity of his fellowmen. This is not so, for what is implicit is that the parcels of wealth controlled by individuals are the possessions of the corporation. It is not accidental that poor people do not go hungry. During my entire stay among the Bedouin I never saw one of them beg or suffer hunger, however marginal the diet of many. Clearly, those with a surplus can and do use it for personal advantage, but the extent to which they can do so is circumscribed by the legal claims which members of a corporation have on the parcels of moveable property held by each of them.

Control over the wealth, whether it be animals or the procreative functions of women, rests, in the final analysis, in a corporation. Inheritance laws specify that women are not legal heirs,⁸ and that all male children are equal heirs. Women do, in fact, come to control property, and it is rare that wealth is equally divided among male heirs. The precise details of inheritance may partly be decided by a father, but he is limited in his actions. Most of the time inheritance disputes are not of the kind which require action by the corporate group; a case which occurred while I was resident with the Bedouin did, however, invoke immediate action. A man, who had left the desert to live in a village on the plateau, had only one daughter. He made it known that he intended to will his entire property to his daughter. When the news was brought to the camps of his fellow agnates, there was great consternation, because, as became clear in their lengthy discussions, the threat now existed that a substantial parcel of property would be removed from the group, a threat made real by the proposed marriage of the daughter to a man of another tribe. The court would have to recognise the daughter's right to some of the property, and the members of the group reluctantly had to concede that there was little they could do about this, but they had one action left to them — they decided that her nearest agnate should demand her in marriage. Usually, the choice of husband for a daughter is a decision

⁸ The Bedouin are Sunni Muslims, and, as Samusi, belong to the Maliki school in legal matters. According to court law, women are heirs. However, actual Bedouin practice is contrary to law. For, if women were permitted to inherit, since many marry outside the corporation into which they were born, they could alienate its resources.

Cases

The Meaning of Marriage

581 Until marriage the changes in a man's life have been in the nature of
585 an ordered sequence of development from a child to be cared for — the only
342 time in his life when a father, without inhibition, showers on him his love
[593] and affection — to one who, by degrees, makes an increasing contribution to
a production unit. Marriage necessitates that a man pitch a tent for himself.

With a tent he becomes a potential host and protector of others. The local
idiom for marriage is "to set up a tent." It would be quite improper to use
[196] the verb "to marry" when inquiring whether a marriage has taken place
[195] since this verb also has the meaning of "to have sexual intercourse." In-
stead the euphemism, "Have you pitched a tent?" is used. The Arabic word
for a tent in this context is *Bait*. It is not used to refer to a military tent, nor
to the small tent which shelters only a widow. It is reserved for the Bedouin
tent, which usually has a wool top, and, most importantly, holds the promise
of the continuation of life, whether it shelters a newly married couple, a
mature family or young unmarried people. (The word *Bait* represents a
complex concept, and it would be too much of a diversion here to discuss
the various points of its significance. It is essential to understand that its

[198] meaning is not confined to a tent in the physical sense.) Its top has *Baraka*
(divine goodness) in it; the quality of *Haram*, which makes it possible for the
tent to be used as a sanctuary, is associated with it and this quality of *Haram*
extends, moreover, to the ropes of the tent, so that anyone who clutches them
comes under the protection of the owner. In it, the wife must permanently
reside and her husband has the legal right to insist on this. In it too, he
has the legal right of sexual access to a woman, his wife. Any children
born in it he can claim as his own. With the erection of a tent the son
[885] reaches adulthood, and it is in this sense that he can be said to have acquired
a domain of his own.

581 Marriage gives a son greater freedom and less dependence on his father
585 in another sense. A second euphemism used for marriage is "making a
[593] relationship," specifically an affinal one. Relationships between a man and
[095] his father-in-law are diverse and are used in various ways in different situa-
606 tions. Here, the particular aspect which needs to be stressed is that a man
425 can cajole his father-in-law, and (through his wife) wealth, in the form
• 556 of animals, may pass from the former to the latter. Reciprocal gifts are passed
between affines on certain occasions, but in addition small amounts may
pass which are not connected with the formal occasions of exchanges. Debt
lies between them. It begins with the initiation of marriage negotiations,
583 when the suitor's kinsmen take a prescribed number of sheep to present to
584 the girl's father if negotiations are successful. They promise to transfer
606 bride-wealth^o to the girl's father. A few weeks after the marriage, the hus-

[191] ^o I use the word "bride-wealth" because it has become so familiar in the literature,
but the only similarity between the *Sahiba* of the Bedouin and the bride-wealth of

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in position immediately anyone else appears at the entrance to the tent.¹¹ Women cook, but they do not serve the meal to males, nor are they responsible for the distribution of meat among them. Parts of an animal are carefully specified, and the various portions distributed at a meal carry with them a great deal of significance. A host can honour, flatter, disappoint or even insult his guest, depending on the precise distribution of meat he adopts. Designated portions should go to certain kinsmen if they are present, but this still leaves a wide margin of choice, and a host can use this choice as part of the many means at his disposal for directing his relationships with other men. A political link can be forged or another snapped by the distribution of portions of meat at the commensal meal.

The Bedouin Ideal Type of Family as a Unit of Production

This account of the division of labour is far from inclusive of all the tasks carried out. The details given are only barely sufficient to provide some indication of the necessary composition of a family. Referring again to the Bedouin sentiments about the matter, it is now possible to give it some numerical precision. The number of females should be a minimum of about three, including a mother, a teen-age daughter and a child of about eight years. Males should number about six: a father, relieved of most chores to act as director; a son in his middle to late twenties, to plough; a second son, in his early to middle twenties, to herd the camels; a third, in his late teens to early twenties, to shepherd the sheep; a fourth, middle to late teens, to look after the goats; and a younger son to fetch, carry and run errands about the camp. The family of the ordinary Bedouin, they say, shows this sex and age distribution; although they recognise that a politically ambitious man with the wealth to match his aspirations would require more of both sexes — particularly women, since the burden of entertainment increases rapidly with a man's climb to power and fame.

Clearly, the basis of Bedouin sentiment concerning family structure is its approximation to an ideal production unit. Some families display the features of this ideal, but even they enjoy the productive benefits of this composition for a very limited period only. The family, as described above, can only be an ephemeral unit, since the age structure constantly changes, women are removed by marriage, men move away and death affects it at any point at any time. The Bedouin family is a fiction in the sense that it can be said to have a characteristic composition. The mistake they make is to conceive of it as a particular kinship structure related to production. The substance of what has been referred to as a fiction is that, if viewed as a productive unit, it bears close consistency with reality. Freed of the need to examine it in terms of specifically limited kinship relationships, and no longer anchored to the inhabitants of a single tent, the distribution of people according to sex and

¹¹ This is the general rule. In practice, the use of the divider can indicate an intimacy or distance in relationships, most subtly.

Cases

621 Genealogically he was their father's brother, but he was of their same age
592 generation, and behaved as if he was their agnatic equal. Towards his own
578 brother (16), he behaved as if the latter was his uncle, for he was much his
[604] junior in age and his uncle had virtually brought him up from boyhood.
[428] They had quarrelled bitterly because his brother (16) had given him only
[593] a fraction of his inheritance, which he himself, in turn, should have
shared with his young full brother (not shown on the diagram) but he did
not do so. This youngest brother left (15) for this reason and now resides
621 with (16), his full brother's enemy. Two of the men (14 and 13) of this
592 group of four were the chief herdsmen of the camp, although they were
[233] assisted for short periods by (12) and (15), who also helped tend the
[571] camels in other ways. Their connection with the group centered on Tent
A was a mutual close link to a politically powerful person (not shown on the
genealogies) to whom they are deeply loyal and who, while I was among
them, was actively opposed to the common political enemy of them all (16),
and who in earlier years had challenged the leadership of (2) of Tent A.
[613] There is also the fact that they were all linked within a close range of
[602] agnation. This linkage included, too, the owner of Tent F (17), not in
fact the descendant of the man shown in the diagram — he was the son of
a slave wife; his genitor was a slave, but his mother's master reared him,
freed him and he is now given as his son in the genealogy. He lives with his
wife, of client origin, together with her children from a previous husband,
(18), who divorced her, and his own children. Aging, he no longer acted
as a regular herdsmen, but relieved other men in the camp, and also spent
some time shepherding.

621 The details given of the strands which run through the camp to tie these
591 particular people together are so few that, like the Bedouin plough, they do
no more than scratch the surface, but they are sufficient to permit a few
general statements. The camp, and particularly the precise disposition of
621 its tents, shows a group of males clustered together to share two of the main
591 economic tasks: shepherding and herding. The physically strong adult males
233 of Tents D and E shoulder the burden of herding all the camels of the camp,
462 and the men of Tents B, A and C shepherd all the sheep, with (17) of
Tent F serving both purposes. This number of men allows some to remain
in the camp at all times, to free one of them for a journey to the distant
market when supplies of sugar and tea are necessary, and to enable one or
two men, at short notice, to hurry away on horse or camel to search for
lost animals.¹⁴

Economic Determinants of the General Structure of the Camp

621 It is also clear from these details that, given the disparities in wealth
594 (although all men have some wealth), the diet of most is considerably
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14 There is little point in seeking the lost animals themselves in the first instance.
A man travels from camp to camp asking for information, and when he has gathered
his clues, he searches a neighbourhood.

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ameliorated in its protein content, particularly by the generosity of the occupants of the nucleating Tent A. Not that they are the only ones who ever slaughter their animals for food. Others do so, albeit much less frequently. Whoever kills an animal, everyone present in the camp is given a share, and the men always eat in the tent of the donor, sitting around one bowl. Thus, the surplus that builds up at one point is redistributed among those suffering a shortage, and meat, in a society where the climate and way of life militate against its storage for more than a few days, is more efficiently used. Many other general economic points could be deduced. These general statements could, however, be made of practically any camp, whatever the specific differences.

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Affinity and Matrilaterality in the Structure of the Camp

Economic considerations determine the general structure of these small camps, but do not account for the particular people gathered in them. Perhaps one of the most striking features of these camps, which comes out clearly in the one discussed here, is the confined agnatic span which links the males. Lest it be underestimated, I wish to stress the profound significance of this fact. While granting its importance it is equally necessary to stress that the span, potentially, could be considerably reduced; in some camps it is. Many of the closer agnates of the men of this camp are not shown on the genealogy included with the diagram; (7), (15) and (16), for example, all have brothers, (12) has a large number of first paternal cousins and so on. Therefore, this particular cluster of agnates formed for reasons other than agnatic ties. The most direct single thread connecting Tents A, B and C is that which runs through women. Men of many other camps are all linked in this way, directly. Five tents of this camp are connected through a female link to a common ancestress, whose name still defines the group, two ascending generations for one adult male, three from others and four from others. If greater elaboration could have been shown on the genealogy without confusion, additional links through women could have been demonstrated. Affinity and matrilaterality are the prime movers in bringing agnates together as neighbours.

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Other Factors Affecting the Structure of the Camp

Other considerations narrow the area in choice of residence. The quest for power where every man entertains hope of achievement where ambitions are not stifled by the rigour of rank and a small amount of wealth provides a basis for a beginning is also a significant factor in considering the composition of camps. The generosity of the people in Tent A was not entirely altruistic. Justly, it had won them repute, but the repute itself was an important aspect of the political power they enjoyed. They also acquired the services of several men to manage their animals, an impossible strain for them alone. And with their shepherds and herdsmen they secured devoted followers. It was hinted in discussing the structure of the camp that changes

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